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Triggering Tinker:
Student Speech in the Age of
Cyberharassment
ARI EZRA WALDMAN*
This essay challenges the common assumption that public schools have limited authority to regulate cyberbullying
that originates and takes place off campus. That argument
presumes a level of myopia, clarity, and literalism in the law
that simply does not exist. First, even assuming it existed, a
geographic requirement is an outdated creature of a pre-Internet age. Cyberbullying poses unique challenges to young
people, educators, and schools not contemplated when the
Court decided its student speech cases. Second, I argue that
a campus presence requirement for regulating any kind of
off-campus cyberspeech never really existed, so any suggestion to the contrary offers false clarity based entirely on
dicta or assumptions. And third, to the extent that the Court
referred to the geographic boundaries of a school in its
quartet of student speech cases, the justices’ words cannot
be taken too literally. Like references to the four walls of the
office in public employee speech cases, a campus presence
*

Associate Professor of Law; Director, Innovation Center for Law and
Technology, New York Law School; Affiliate Scholar, Princeton University Center for Information Technology Policy. Ph.D., Columbia University; J.D., Harvard
Law School. Part of this essay is adapted from my articles, Hostile Educational
Environments, 71 MARYLAND L. REV. 705 (2012), and Tormented: Anti-Gay Bullying in Schools, 85 TEMPLE L. REV. 385 (2012). In this essay, I take my argument
in new directions, as my thinking on the subject of off-campus cyberspeech has
evolved over the last several years. Thanks to Mary Anne Franks, A. Michael
Froomkin, Joel Reidenberg, Diane L. Rosenfeld, Corey Rayburn Yung, and Elana
Zeide. Special thanks to the members of the University of Miami Law Review for
organizing a fantastic symposium on student speech and privacy.
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requirement is just a proxy for or a paradigmatic example of
applying a broader, more flexible standard focused on relationships: between the victim and her harasser and between
them and the school.
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INTRODUCTION
We are often told that public schools have limited authority to
regulate student-to-student cyberharassment, commonly known as
cyberbullying, when it originates and takes place off campus.1
The assumption is prevalent in cyberbullying policies2 and in legal
1

See, e.g., Jan Hoffman, Online Bullies Pull Schools Into the Fray, NEW
YORK TIMES (June 27, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/28/style/28bully.
html (“fewer than half [of the states that had enacted anti-bullying laws] offer
guidance about whether schools may intervene in bullying involving ‘electronic
communication,’ which almost always occurs outside of school . . . .”).
2
See, e.g., SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF DETROIT, MICHIGAN, Order
Adopting the Detroit Public Schools Anti-Bullying Policy, 2012-EMRR-22 (June
6, 2012), available at http://detroitk12.org/content/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/
Order-2012-EMRR-22.pdf (“This policy also pertains to usage of electronic technology and electronic communication that is used for bullying, or cyber-bullying.
Electronic technology and electronic communication that is used for bullying or
cyber-bullying which occurs outside of school, school property, school-sponsored
functions and activities, and school-related transportation is not within the scope
of the individual school or school District’s responsibility, provided, however, if
the telecommunications device or service is owned by or under the control of District, the policy applies.”).
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guidance from advocacy organizations.3 This idea was also floated
by at least one former Supreme Court justice.4 Beyond the “schoolhouse gate,”5 the argument goes, students enjoy all the free speech
rights entitled to ordinary citizens. And short of making a true threat6
or engaging in any of the few other activities unprotected by the First
Amendment,7 students are generally safe from their public schools
reaching their regulatory arms into the web.
That argument presumes a level of myopia, clarity, and literalism in the law that simply does not exist. First, even assuming it
3

The ACLU of Washington State, for example, states “[g]enerally, your
school cannot censor or discipline you for posting content or sending a message
that is: sent during non-school hours; and sent using an off-campus Internet connection; and sent using a non-school computer; and sent using a non-school email address.” Student Rights and Responsibilities in the Digital Age: A Guide for
Public School Students in Washington State, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF
WASH. STATE (Jan. 2012), https://aclu-wa.org/student-rights-and-responsibilities
-digital-age-guide-public-school-students-washington-state#ID.
4
During the question and answer session after former Supreme Court Justice
John Paul Stevens delivered his keynote address at the University of Miami
School of Law’s Symposium, “The Constitution on Campus,” the Author asked
the Justice if the Court’s student speech jurisprudence would permit public
schools to regulate off-campus cyberbullying that targeted students. Justice Stevens suggested that he would be inclined to find that schools had no authority if
the speech took place off campus. Post-Speech Question and Answer Session with
Justice John Paul Stevens (Ret.), United States Supreme Court, in Coral Gables,
Fla. (Feb. 5, 2016).
5
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
(“It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been
the unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 50 years.”).
6
See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1969) (holding that a
“true threat” is not protected by the First Amendment); Wisniewski v. Bd. of
Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that schools have broader authority
over student speech than allowed by the “true threats” standard in Watts). See also
Lovell ex rel. Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996)
(“In light of the violence prevalent in schools today, school officials are justified
in taking very seriously student threats against faculty or other students.”).
7
Among other activities, the First Amendment does not protect obscenity,
“fighting words,” child pornography, incitement, “true threats,” solicitation to
commit criminal acts, or defamation/libel/slander. See Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 481 (1957); Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942);
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 447 (1969); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516–17 (1951); Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49–50 n.10 (1961).
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existed, a geographic requirement is an outdated creature of a preInternet age. Cyberbullying poses unique challenges to young people, educators, and schools not contemplated when the Supreme
Court decided its student speech cases.8 Second, I argue that a campus presence requirement for regulating any kind of off-campus
cyber-speech never existed. And third, to the extent that the Supreme Court referred to the four walls of the school in its quartet of
student speech cases,9 the justices’ words cannot be taken too literally. Like similar references in public employee speech cases,10 any
mention of a school’s campus are just paradigmatic examples for
applying a broader, more flexible standard focused on relationships
among the victim, the harasser, and the school. This essay argues
that the Tinker standard11 for evaluating student speech is triggered
not by the presence of that speech on campus, but by the speaker’s
actions as student qua student and his connections to the school environment.
To be clear, this thesis focuses on Tinker’s trigger, or when a
court moves student speech from standard First Amendment doctrine to the more limited freedom of Tinker and its progeny.12 Applying that standard to specific speech is a question for another day.
What’s more, eradicating cyberbullying will take a comprehensive
approach from policymakers, educators, psychologists, parents, and

8
The four student speech cases are Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675
(1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); & Morse v.
Frederick, 551 U.S 393 (2007). Between 2008 and 2012, petitions for certiorari
on five cyber-speech cases were denied by the Supreme Court. Judge Thomas A.
Jacobs (Ret.), Will the Supreme Court Consider Cyber-Bullying?, THOMSON
REUTERS LEGAL SOL. BLOG (May 7, 2014), http://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/government/will-supreme-court-consider-cyberbullying/.
9
See generally Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 675; Hazelwood,
484 U.S. at 260; Morse, 551 U.S at 393.
10
See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420–21 (2006).
11
See generally Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
12
The Tinker standard is triggered when a student’s speech or other conduct
“materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others.” Id. at 513. Additionally, “the Tinker line of cases focus on
whether or not material disruptions have occurred or whether or not they are reasonably likely to occur.” Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ., 383 F. Supp.
2d 965, 974 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
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lawyers. Punishments alone will not achieve much.13 But schools
have a compelling interest in having the flexibility to punish cyberbullies for at least three reasons. First, cyberbullying can devastate
its victims, most of whom are already marginalized in society.14 If
unaddressed, cyberbullying will stunt its victims’ educational and
professional achievement.15 Second, as a gendered and sexualized
phenomenon,16 cyberharassment is anathematic to the core democratic principles of equality. Finally, letting cyberbullying go unpunished out of a misguided desire to protect free speech actually silences students,17 thus offending the very norms inaction is supposed to protect.
This essay proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly defines cyberbullying and distinguishes it from other forms of cyberspeech. Part
II lays out the argument for a geographic campus presence requirement and shows how lower courts have applied it to the detriment
of victims. Part III challenges this assumption on three grounds. I
use the text of the Supreme Court’s four student speech cases—
13
See Lyrissa Lidsky & Andrea Pinzon Garcia, How Not to Criminalize
Cyberbullying, 77 MO. L. REV. 693, 697 (2012) (discussing how overbroad definitions in state bullying criminalization statutes leads to pernicious consequences); see also Ari Ezra Waldman, Tormented: Antigay Bullying in Schools,
84 TEMPLE L. REV. 385, 387 (2012) [hereinafter Waldman, Tormented] (arguing
that pre-emptive, affirmative steps that improve school climate and provide support to marginalized students are likely to be more effective at stopping bullying
than ever more draconian punishments).
14
Recognizing a Cyberbully, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. (Nov. 15, 2011),
https://www.nsf.gov/discoveries/disc_summ.jsp?cntn_id=122271 (“Anyone who
is in a marginalized group is more likely to be cyberbullied.” (quoting Faye
Mishna, University of Toronto)).
15
Stuart Wolpert, Victims of Bullying Suffer Academically as Well, UCLA
Psychologists Report, UCLA NEWSROOM (Aug. 19, 2010), http://newsroom.ucla.
edu/releases/victims-of-bullying-suffer-academically-168220.
16
See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATES CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 13 (2014)
(“Cyber harassment disproportionately impacts women.”) [hereinafter CITRON,
HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE]; see also Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment
2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655, 657, 682 (2012) (“[T]argeted sexual harassment of
women in cyberspace may not only produce all of the effects that ‘real-life’ harassment does, but also has the potential to be even more pernicious and longlasting than ‘real-life’ harassment.”).
17
Stephanie Pappas, Why Bully Victims Suffer in Silence, LIVESCIENCE (Nov.
17, 2010, 7:37 AM), http://www.livescience.com/8994-bully-victims-suffer-silence.html.
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Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District,18 Bethel School
District No. 403 v. Fraser,19 Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier,20 and Morse v. Frederick21—to demonstrate that the requirement stands on shaky dicta. I then argue that the Court, as it
does in federal employee speech cases, uses geographic boundaries
as proxies for a relational nexus between the school and its students.
Finally, Part IV argues that, given the authority to regulate cyberbullying, schools have a compelling interest to do so and would, in
fact, enhance and protect free speech.
I. DEFINING “CYBERBULLYING”
Definitions are important. There are a host of definitions of
“cyberharassment” or “cyberbullying” milling around.22 Imprecise
and inconsistent definitions frustrate our ability to understand, talk
about, and solve the problem.23 Danielle Keats Citron, the leading
cyberhate and harassment scholar, defines cyberharassment generally as repeated online expression that intentionally targets a particular person and causes the targeted individual substantial
emotional distress and/or the fear of bodily harm.24 There are five
18

393 U.S. 503 (1969).
478 U.S. 675 (1986).
20
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
21
551 U.S 393 (2007).
22
The National Conference of State Legislatures, for example, defines cyberbullying as “the willful and repeated use of cell phones, computers, and other
electronic communication devices to harass and threaten others.” Cyberbullying,
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/cyberbullying.aspx. The Centers for Disease Control defines
bullying as “any unwanted aggressive behavior(s) by another youth or group of
youths, who are not siblings or current dating partners, involving an observed or
perceived power imbalance and is repeated multiple times or is highly likely to be
repeated.” Featured Topic: Bullying Research, CTR.’S FOR DISEASE CONTROL
AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/youthviolence/bullyingresearch/.
23
See Amanda Hess, On the Internet, Men Are Called Names. Women Are
Stalked and Sexually Harassed, SLATE (Oct. 22, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.
slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2014/10/22/pew_online_harassment_study_men_are_
called_names_women_are_stalked_and_sexually.html.
24
CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 16, at 3; see also Danielle Citron, Defining Online Harassment, FORBES (Oct. 23, 2014, 11:07 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/daniellecitron/2014/10/23/defining-online-harassm
ent/#1d8b0f944360.
19
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core elements to that definition: repetition, use of digital technology,
intent, targeting, and substantiality of harm.25
Cyberbullying is a subcategory of cyberharassment that includes
all five of those elements but is focused squarely on youth-to-youth
behavior.26 It can be understood as repeated online expression that
is intended to cause substantial harm by one youth or group of
youths targeting another with an observed or perceived power imbalance.27 The asymmetry of power, which could be physical (i.e.,
an athlete attacking a non-athlete), psychological (i.e., a popular student attacking someone with low self-esteem), or based on identity
(i.e., a member of the majority attacking a member of a traditionally
marginalized and discriminated minority), draws the line between
schoolyard teasing and bullying.28 It should come as no surprise,
then, that young members of the LGBTQ community are uniquely
susceptible to bullying and its tragic consequences.29 They are bullied because they deviate from the norm30 and “because anti-gay
25

Citron, Defining Online Harassment, supra note 24.
JONATHAN CLOUGH, PRINCIPLES OF CYBERCRIME 427 (2d ed. 2015) (“As a
sub-category of online harassment, cyberbullying is a multifaceted and challenging problem to address.”); see also Jason Koebler, Cyber Bullying Growing More
Malicious, Experts Say, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (June 3, 2011, 8:00 AM),
http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/high-school-notes/2011/06/03/cyberbullying-growing-more-malicious-experts-say (cyberlaw expert Parry Aftab defines cyberbullying as between minors).
27
The definition brings together several similar definitions into one clear
statement. See, e.g., DAN OLWEUS, AGGRESSION IN THE SCHOOLS: BULLIES AND
WHIPPING BOYS 3–6 (1978); Tonja R. Nansel et al., Bullying Behaviors Among
US Youth: Prevalence and Association with Psychosocial Adjustment, 285 JAMA
2094, 2094 (2001).
28
See Waldman, Tormented, supra note 13, at 389–91 (quoting Nansel, supra
note 27, at 2094); see KEN RIGBY, BULLYING IN SCHOOLS: AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT 19, 26 (Elisa Webb ed., rev. ed. 2007) (“[A]n imbalance of power is an
essential element in any sensible definition of bullying . . . Wherever there is a
power imbalance, whatever its source, an individual can be reduced in status, and
sometimes humiliated by the insensitive bully.”); see also Marilyn Langevin,
Teasing and Bullying: Helping children deal with teasing and bullying: for parents, teachers, and other adults, INST. FOR STUTTERING TREATMENT & RES.,
http://www.isastutter.org/CDRomProject/teasing/tease_bully.html (last visited
June 9, 2016) (stating that a key element of bullying is a power imbalance).
29
Waldman, Tormented, supra note 13, at 391.
30
See, e.g., Anthony R. D’Augelli et al., Childhood Gender Atypicality, Victimization, and PTSD Among Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Youth, 21 J.
26
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bullying is either tacitly or explicitly condoned by anti-gay bigotry
in society at large.”31
This definition of cyberbullying captures the worst online aggressive behavior while excluding the otherwise mean, hateful, and
distasteful speech that free speech norms tend to tolerate.32 Cyberbullying is, at bottom, cyberharassment involving youth.33 And it is
an epidemic affecting our schools.34
II. THE CAMPUS PRESENCE ARGUMENT
One barrier to taking cyberbullying more seriously is an interpretation of the Supreme Court’s student speech cases that sees
the geographic boundaries of the school as the limit of the school’s
authority.35 The argument has an air of credibility: it relies on intuition and the plain language of the Court’s opinions. It also has been

INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1462, 1477–80 (2006) (“The impact of these early experiences of difference, labeling, criticism by others, and victimization can be
seen in the current mental health findings, especially trauma symptoms.”).
31
Waldman, Tormented, supra note 13, at 391.
32
See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (noting “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks . . . .”); see also Richard
Wike, Americans More Tolerant of Offensive Speech than Others in the World,
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2016/10/12/americans-more-tolerant-of-offensive-speech-than-others-in-theworld/ (“Americans are much more tolerant of offensive speech than people in
other nations. For instance, 77% in the U.S. support the right of others to make
statements that are offensive to their own religious beliefs . . . 67% think people
should be allowed to make public statements that are offensive to minority
groups . . . [and] at least half endorse the right to sexually explicit speech. Americans don’t necessarily like offensive speech more than others, but they are much
less inclined to outlaw it.”).
33
See supra note 26.
34
See, e.g., Joseph G. Kosciw et al., The 2009 National School Climate Survey: The Experiences of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Youth in Our
Nation’s Schools, GAY, LESBIAN, & STRAIGHT EDUC. NETWORK 28 (2010) (In a
survey of students in schools in all fifty states and the District of Columbia, more
than half of gay, lesbian, and bisexual students reported being harassed through
electronic mediums, and almost a fifth had experienced it frequently).
35
See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S 393 (2007).
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hammered home by lower courts.36 In this section, I briefly summarize the argument for a campus presence requirement and show how
it has been adopted and spread throughout the judiciary.
The conventional wisdom states that the Court introduced the
on-campus/off-campus distinction in Tinker v. Des Moines.37 The
decision’s most famous line—“[i]t can hardly be argued that either
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate”38—refers to a geographic boundary. Indeed, the entirety of Tinker’s world—the black
arm band protest itself and Justice Fortas’ discussion of student
rights versus school authority—appears, on first glance, to exist only
inside school grounds.39 The evidence of this is manifold. The students wore their black armbands to school on two different days.40
To argue that students retain some speech rights at school, Justice
Fortas turned to West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
where the Court upheld a student’s right to refuse to salute the flag
while in school.41 These student rights were balanced against the
authority of states and school officials to “prescribe and control conduct in the schools.”42 Furthermore, when Justice Fortas referred to
the disruptive potential of student speech, he limited its
universe to speech that took place “in class, in the lunchroom, or on
the campus.”43 The prospect of having to consider a school’s authority over off-campus speech never occurred to him.
A similar theme repeats in Justice White’s opinion in Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier.44 Schools could regulate some student
36

See infra notes 48–52 (explaining the holdings of
LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001); Boucher v. Sch. Bd.,
134 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 1998); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008);
Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998); &
Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000)).
37
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
38
Id. at 506 (emphasis added).
39
See generally id. at 512–14.
40
Id. at 504.
41
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507; see generally W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
42
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 (emphasis added).
43
Id. at 508; see also id. at 512–13 (“When [the student] is in the cafeteria,
or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, he may
express his opinions . . . .”).
44
See generally Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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speech, the Court stated, “even though the government could not
censor similar speech outside the school.”45 Nor was the student
newspaper at issue in Hazelwood a public forum like a street or a
park; rather, it was part of the “school facilities” that served the mission of educating students.46
Accordingly, throughout the Supreme Court’s student speech jurisprudence, the speech always took place inside school grounds or
closely connected to school activities.47 This created the impression
that the Tinker standard can only be triggered by a campus presence
requirement.
Lower federal courts agree. Indeed, almost every lower court
that has had occasion to take up the issue has required off-campus
speech to have some connection to the geographic boundaries of the
school before the Tinker standard can be applied. Some courts require that the speaker bring the speech through the gates himself48
or at least know that it would be distributed within the boundaries
of the school.49 Others require reasonable foreseeability that the
speech would breach campus walls.50 Still, others require that such
speech at least be seen or heard on campus.51 But there is consensus

45

Id. at 266 (emphasis added).
Id. at 267.
47
See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (where students showed
a banner stating “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” at a school-sponsored, but off-campus,
viewing of the Olympic torch relay).
48
See LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding the suspension of a student who wrote a poem describing a school shooting because the student brought the poem inside the boundaries of campus, thus
triggering Tinker).
49
See, e.g., Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of the Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821,
822 (7th Cir. 1998) (where Tinker was triggered because the student speech, an
article published off-campus explaining “how to hack the school[‘]s gay ass computers,” was distributed on school grounds in the bathrooms, lockers, and in the
cafeteria).
50
See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008) (applying
Tinker to off-campus speech calling school officials “douchebags” only because
it was “reasonably foreseeable” that the speech would make its way on to campus).
51
See, e.g., Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175,
1177– 78, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (applying Tinker to a website created by a student off-campus only when another student accessed the website at school and
showed it to a teacher, bringing it within the geographic boundaries of the school).
46
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under this divergence: in all cases, whether they uphold a punishment or reject it,52 lower federal courts have interpreted the language
of the Supreme Court’s rulings literally and required that off-campus speech come on to campus before it could be subject to a
school’s regulatory authority.53 As the Second Circuit stated, “our
willingness to defer to the schoolmaster’s expertise in administering
school discipline rests, in large measure, upon the supposition that
the arm of authority does not reach beyond the schoolhouse gate.”54
Given the universality of the campus presence doctrine in the courts,
it is no wonder it has bled so deeply into our collective conscience.
III. A RELATIONAL NEXUS
Even if we assume that the Supreme Court did intend, in its quartet of student speech cases,55 to create a campus presence requirement, such a trigger for Tinker is woefully outdated in the digital
age. More importantly, a close reading of the Court’s decisions
shows that a strict, geographic campus presence trigger never existed. Rather, the Court makes clear that its references to gates,56
boundaries,57 and school activities58 are proxies for a more flexible
relational standard for regulating student speech. This standard,
when applied to cyberbullying cases, would give schools the flexibility to restrict cyberbullying that affects the school environment
while protecting students’ dissident speech on matters of truly public concern.

52

See, e.g., Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089–
90 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (refusing to apply Tinker because the speech at issue, a
website that included mock obituaries of school personnel and allowed visitors to
vote on who should “die,” was created entirely off-campus).
53
See generally supra notes 48–52.
54
Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1044–
45 (2d Cir. 1979).
55
See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S 393 (2007).
56
See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
57
See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681.
58
See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
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A. An Outdated Trigger
Requiring student speech to take place on campus before school
officials could censor, regulate, or punish it may have made sense in
1969 when Tinker was decided. It is hard to imagine how off-campus speech in a pre-Internet age could substantially disrupt the
school. Things are different now.
Internet and digital technologies are everywhere. We use
them to socialize59 and date,60 buy coffee,61 and watch movies.62 The
Internet is in our homes and in our clothes;63 it links up our home
appliances and even our stuffed animals.64 Though we may be
speeding ahead without thinking things through,65 the fact remains

59

According to its most recent statistics, Facebook has over 1.79 billion
monthly active users, which is an approximately 8.5% year-over-year increase.
Stats, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2017).
60
Pew Research Center has found that approximately 15% of American
adults have used online dating websites or mobile dating apps, up from 11% who
reported doing so in 2013. The share of 18–24 year olds who report using online
dating apps tripled between 2013 and 2015. The number of 55–64 year olds using
similar platforms doubled over the same period. AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH
CTR., 15% OF AMERICAN ADULTS HAVE USED ONLINE DATING SITES OR MOBILE
DATING APPS 2–3 (2016), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2016/02/
PI_2016.02.11_Online-Dating_FINAL.pdf.
61
See Molly McHugh, How to Buy Starbucks Coffee with Your iPhone,
DIGITAL TRENDS (Jan. 19, 2012, 3:07 PM), http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile
/how-to-buy-starbucks-coffee-with-your-iphone/.
62
See, e.g., Ben Popper, Netflix Passes 81 Million Subscribers, but Predicts
Slower Growth Ahead, THE VERGE (Apr. 18, 2016, 4:28 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2016/4/18/11454362/netflix-q1-2016-earnings-81-million-subscribers.
63
See Michael Sawh, Sweat Detecting Wearable can Tell You when You’re
Tired or Dehydrated, WAREABLE (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.wareable.com/wearable-tech/sweat-detecting-wearable-can-identify-health-issues-before-they-happen-2239.
64
See Leo Kelion, Google Patents ‘Creepy’ Internet Toys to Run the Home,
BBC (May 22, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-32843518.
65
See Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, The Internet of Heirlooms and
Disposable Things, 17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 581, 583 (2016) (“The problem is that
we are not taking the decision to wire up an artifact to the Internet seriously
enough. A chip-centric mentality has taken over—one that is guided by an overly
simplistic principle: ‘Internet connectivity makes good objects great.’ Guided by
this upgrade mentality, we seem to be in a rush to connect everything. Meanwhile
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that Internet and digital technologies are pervasive, particularly
among young people. Cell phone owners between the ages of 18 and
24 send more than 109 text messages per day, on average.66 And in
2015, 90% of young adults surveyed reported using social media
platforms.67 Both text messages and social media are home to rampant cyberbullying.68
In part because the Internet has come to pervade our daily lives,
it has taken on an increasingly salient role in education. Teachers
are integrating mobile technology, Internet tools, and social media
into classrooms.69 There are countless websites dedicated to helping
them.70 And public-private partnerships are working to provide
computers and Internet access to public schools.71 All of these programs encourage both the integration of the Internet into the classroom and its use as an educational tool at home. Therefore, the
“school environment,” to use Justice Fortas’ term in Tinker,72 is no
longer defined by the four walls of the classroom. It now extends as
seemingly none of us, including policy makers and regulators, have fully appreciated the significance of companies transforming from artifact and device ‘makers’ to ‘service providers.’”).
66
See AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICANS AND TEXT
MESSAGING 2 (2011), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media//Files/Reports
/2011/Americans%20and%20Text%20Messaging.pdf.
67
See ANDREW PERRIN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., SOCIAL MEDIA USAGE: 2005–
2015 4 (2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/10/PI_2015-10-08_SocialNetworking-Usage-2005-2015_FINAL.pdf.
68
AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., TEENS, KINDNESS AND
CRUELTY ON SOCIAL NETWORK SITES 38 (2011), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/
media//Files/Reports/2011/PIP_Teens_Kindness_Cruelty_SNS_Report_Nov_
2011_FINAL_110711.pdf.
69
See, e.g., Courtney Blackwell, Teacher Practices with Mobile Technology
Integrating Tablet Computers into the Early Childhood Classroom, 7 J. EDUC.
RES. 1, 3 (2015); Paige Abe & Nickolas A. Jordan, Integrating Social Media Into
the Classroom Curriculum, 18 ABOUT CAMPUS 16, 16 (2013).
70
See, e.g., Teach with Technology: Everything You Need, SCHOLASTIC (June
11, 2016), http://www.scholastic.com/teachers/unit/teach-technology-everything
-you-need.
71
See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, White
House to Launch “Digital Promise” Initiative (Sept. 16, 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/white-house-launch-dig
ital-promise-initiative (discussing initiative funded by the Department of Education, Carnegie Corporation, and William and Flora Hewlett Foundation to increase access to technology in schools).
72
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506. (1969).

2017]

TRIGGERING TINKER

441

far as the Internet tools it deploys to teach students how to add and
subtract, read and write, think and grow.
This is not a radical argument. Mary Anne Franks has argued
that since our pervasive online presence allows “sexual harassment
in one setting [to] produce harms in another,”73 sexual harassment
law that traditionally protected victimized women in “single, protected settings” like the workplace under Title VII, the school under
Title IX, and, to some extent, at home and in prison, inadequately
captures what modern sex harassment looks like.74 Franks argues
persuasively for a multiple-setting conception of sexual harassment
because cyberharassment that takes place offsite can have just as
deleterious an effect on a victim’s ability to function in the workplace as traditional forms of workplace harassment.75 This is true of
any kind of cyberharassment. Whether a student uses his or his victim’s Facebook page to make derogatory comments questioning the
victim’s sexuality, or uses Instagram to post altered graphic photos
depicting the victim in compromising situations, or takes to Twitter
to engage in racist, homophobic, and xenophobic harassment, these
attacks can cause students to fear further humiliation, lose interest
in attending school, and close themselves off from a world they find
increasingly hostile.76 Students become unable to learn and unable
to participate in extracurricular activities or school society.77 Their
educational rights are denied when there is no remedy for cyberbullying that negatively affects their day-to-day lives in school, regardless of where their victimization occurred.
B. What the Supreme Court Didn’t Say
A physical on-campus presence requirement is, therefore, antiquated and dangerous in a highly connected and networked world.
73

Franks, supra note 16, at 657.
Id. at 659.
75
Id. (arguing that “sexual harassment in cyberspace produces harm that is
equal to or more severe than sexual harassment that occurs in traditional protected
spaces . . . .”).
76
See Wolpert, supra note 15 (“Students who get bullied run the risk of not
coming to school, not liking school, [and] perceiving school more negatively . . .
Children who are embarrassed or humiliated about being bullied in school are
unlikely to discuss it with their parents or teachers . . . [and] are more likely to
suffer in silence and dislike school.”).
77
See id.
74
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However, it is not entirely clear a campus presence trigger ever existed. The Supreme Court has never held that student speech must
be within the geographic boundaries of the campus to be subject to
school punishment.78 There was never any need to. Three of its student speech cases involved speech that was on campus;79 the fourth
was across the street.80 Therefore, although its jurisprudence is littered with references to the school campus, it would be wrong to
read into them a geographic trigger for the Tinker test.
In Tinker, the Court held that a school may regulate a student’s
expressive conduct if it causes or is reasonably likely to cause a “material[] and substantial[]” disruption to school activities.81 The student antiwar black arm band protest did not meet that threshold because it was “silent,” “passive,” and caused no disruption.82 Nothing
in that standard requires that the student speech at issue be located
within the geographic boundaries of campus.83 That issue was left
open by Tinker: the protest took place on campus, so there was no
geographical question to resolve.

78

See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S 393 (2007).
79
See generally Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 675; Hazelwood,
484 U.S. at 260.
80
See Morse, 551 U.S at 393.
81
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. The Court really listed two triggers: material disruption to classwork and substantial disorder are usually combined into one. The
second trigger is when student speech “inva[des] of the rights of others.” Id. This
essay excludes that prong from its analysis because it has rarely been applied by
lower courts. See Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965,
974 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (“[T]he Court is not aware of a single decision that has
focused on [the ‘rights of others’ prong] in Tinker as the sole basis for upholding
a school’s regulation of student speech . . . the Tinker line of cases focus on
whether or not material disruptions have occurred or whether or not they are reasonably likely to occur.”). That changed when the Ninth Circuit decided Harper
v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006). In that case, the court
held that a school could order removal of a student’s T-shirt that read, among
other things, “HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL ‘Romans 1:27’” because the
message impinged on the rights of minority students to be free of attacks to “core
identifying characteristic[s]” of a marginalized group. Id. at 1171, 1182. Setting
aside Harper, however, the “rights of others” prong is rarely invoked.
82
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
83
See id.
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The Court’s trilogy of student speech cases after Tinker retained
this pattern: a campus presence question was never an issue to be
decided.84 They also went further, using language that made geography seem irrelevant.85 In Fraser, the Court carved out an exception to Tinker’s substantial disruption standard for lewd and offensive speech.86 That is, a graphic sexual speech by a student could be
regulated even absent any real disruption to the school.87 The basis
for the Court’s holding was not where the speech took place, but
rather the inconsistency between the speech and the school’s educational mission.88 That is, while Fraser could have given his speech
free of government interference outside the context of the “school
environment,”89 a phrase borrowed from Tinker,90 the Court held
that where a student engages in lewd, vulgar, or offensive speech,
the school may regulate such speech as part of its duty to teach “essential lessons of civil, mature conduct.”91 Fraser happened to deliver his speech on campus, but the language of the majority and
concurring opinions reflect the Court’s ambivalence toward a strict
campus presence requirement.92 The words “campus” or “grounds”
never appear in the decision.93 Instead, Chief Justice Burger replaced it with “public school education,”94 a phrase that encompasses more than the boundaries of a school’s property.
In Hazelwood, the Court upheld a principal’s decision to remove
two articles on teen pregnancy and divorce from the school’s newspaper.95 Distinguishing Tinker, the Court states that the two cases
84

See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 675; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 260; Morse, 551 U.S

at 393.
85

See generally id.
See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684–85.
87
Id. at 685. (“The First Amendment does not prevent the school officials
from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent’s
would undermine the school’s basic educational mission. A high school assembly
or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit monologue directed towards an
unsuspecting audience of teenage students.”).
88
Id.
89
Id. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring).
90
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
91
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
92
See, e.g., id. at 685; id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring).
93
See generally id.
94
Id. at 683.
95
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272–73 (1988).
86
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posed different issues: Tinker asked whether a school had to tolerate
speech it did not like; Hazelwood addressed whether the school must
affirmatively promote student speech that ran counter to its educational mission.96 After all, the newspaper was part of a journalism
class and bore the school’s emblem.97 In such circumstances, teachers can exercise control over speech that could be interpreted as endorsed by the school.98 Therefore, the Hazelwood exception for
school-sponsored speech has no more of a campus presence requirement than Tinker or Fraser. The issue was not ripe to be decided, as
the newspaper was an in-class activity.99 But even if students
worked on their articles at home and after school, and even if the
paper was distributed off campus, it would still have the school’s
emblem and imprimatur.100 References to the geographic boundaries
of the school are also absent.101
The final case in the quartet is Morse v. Frederick.102 In that
case, a student attended a school-sponsored viewing of the Olympic
Torch Relay as it passed on the street in front of his high school and
held a sign that the principal believed promoted the use of marijuana.103 The Court upheld the school’s suspension of Frederick not
because of where he stood when he expressed his opinions—which
was technically, though just barely, off campus—but because the
school was entitled to make the decision that promoting illegal drug
use was anathematic to its educational mission.104
In Morse and in the other cases, the Court never had the occasion
to hand down a definitive holding on whether a school’s regulatory
authority over student speech requires that the speech exist within
the boundaries of the school. The issue never came up. To suggest
that Tinker and its progeny could never be applied to off-campus
speech transmogrifies a fact of these particular cases into an essential element of their holdings.
96

Id. at 270–71.
See id. at 268.
98
Id. at 271.
99
Id. at 268.
100
See id. at 262.
101
See generally id.
102
551 U.S. 393 (2007).
103
Id. at 397–98. The sign read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS,” (whatever that
means). Id. at 397.
104
Id. at 409–10.
97
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C. Students Acting Qua Students
If the Supreme Court never had occasion to adopt a campus presence requirement, what are we to make of the myriad references in
its opinions to schoolhouse gates,105 classrooms,106 lunchrooms,107
and other physical places in the school?108 Not much. A close reading of these cases suggests that the Supreme Court is not speaking
literally. There is no physical gate delineating the boundaries of student speech; there is no geographic nexus. Rather, the Court has always employed a relational nexus for applying Tinker, where physical presence is just one among many ways to show that a student
was acting qua student—or, in her capacity or status as a member of
the school community—when she spoke. This interpretation of the
law makes sense for two reasons. First, both the Court’s language
and substance supports it. The Court follows almost every reference
to physical locations on campus with a reminder that the campus is
just a symbol of, or stands in for, the educational mission.109 Second,
the Court employs a relational nexus in other, similar circumstances,
particularly to determine when the limited free speech rights of public employees are triggered.110 Like a government worker engaging
in speech in her capacity as a federal employee,111 students acting
qua students are subject to state regulatory authority.112
1. WHAT THE SUPREME COURT DID SAY
Students are “‘persons’ under our Constitution” in and out of
school,113 but it is not the boundary of the school campus that delimits the extent of their rights. Rather, it is the “school environment”114 that plays that role. In its student speech jurisprudence, the
Court defined a school by its mission—to teach and educate minors

105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
See, e.g., id. at 512; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681, 683.
See, e.g., Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13.
See id.
See, e.g., Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688–89; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266.
See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 574 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
See, e.g., Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
Id. at 506.
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in the ways of civil society.115 That mission may extend beyond the
physical classroom. The Court upheld a school’s disciplinary authority in Morse, for example, because school officials must be empowered “to safeguard those entrusted to their care,” regardless of
on which side of the campus boundary line the student held the
sign.116 Similarly, in Fraser, where a student was suspended for
lewd speech, Justice Brennan ignored the on-campus/off-campus
distinction entirely, admitting that Fraser’s “speech may well have
been protected had he given it in school but under different circumstances,” i.e., not at an assembly dedicated to nominating candidates
for student council.117 It was the context in which the speech was
given—the school teaching civic engagement through student council activities—not the location of the speech that tipped the scales.118
It makes sense, then, that the Court’s references to a school campus are cabined by reminders that the school’s educational relationship to its students is salient. In Tinker, the Court distinguished between speech inside and outside of the “schoolhouse gate,”119 but
analyzed the students’ free speech rights in the context of students’
and teachers’ liberty interest in an education that is free of government intrusion and able to prepare the “young for citizenship.”120
Later in the opinion, Justice Fortas seemed to return to the physical
boundaries of the school when he stated that student rights embraced
not only classroom hours, but also the cafeteria, the ball field, and
any part of the “campus during the authorized hours.”121 But he had
already reminded us that “[s]chool officials do not possess absolute

115

Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 (“The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics
class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized social order.
Consciously or otherwise, teachers—and indeed the older students—demonstrate
the appropriate form of civil discourse and political expression by their conduct
and deportment in and out of class. Inescapably, like parents, they are role models.”).
116
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).
117
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring).
118
See id.
119
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
120
Id. at 507 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
637 (1943)).
121
See id. at 512–13.
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authority over their students,” irrespective of their physical location.122 What mattered, instead, was disruption to the educational
mission of the school.123 Similarly, in Fraser, the Court appeared to
suggest that the issue was what kind of speech was allowed “in the
classroom or in school assembly,”124 but then clarified that Fraser’s
vulgar speech could be limited not by virtue of where he spoke, but
because a school has an interest in both protecting minors from his
arguably lewd comments and teaching them about civic responsibility.125 A similar analysis held sway in Hazelwood. In that case, officials were permitted to act not because students created and distributed the newspaper on campus, but only because the paper was part
of the pedagogical mission of a journalism class, bore the imprimatur of the school,126 and the censorship was “reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”127 The fulcrum upon which the
merits of the First Amendment defenses were decided, therefore,
was the relationship of the school to the student qua student.
This is the original wisdom of Tinker. Students retain free
speech rights up to the point that their speech substantially interferes
with the school’s ability to fulfill its mission and educate its community.128 For student speech that occurs on campus, the fact that it
did so is just helpful and easy proof that the educational interests of
the school are at least implicated. The Tinker standard,129 as opposed

122

Id. at 511.
Id. at 513.
124
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (“The determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.”).
125
Id. at 684–85. Compare id. at 685 (“The First Amendment does not prevent
the school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such
as respondent’s would undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”), with
id. (“A high school assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit
monologue directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage students.”).
This language suggests that the important factors are the audience and the educational mission. The location is relevant to, but not determinative of, the Court’s
analysis.
126
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 268 (1998).
127
Id. 273.
128
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
129
Id. at 513 (“When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the
campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on con123
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to complete free speech rights, would apply. Judges considering
such cases can presume, much like the Supreme Court did in its student speech cases, that on-campus speech may be subject to school
disciplinary authority. But when student speech occurs off campus,
its potential impact on the school’s ability to teach is not non-existent. It is just a little less obvious. These cases do not have an easy
proxy of physical presence to meet the substantial impact test. They
have quite a bit of other evidence, though.
2. THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE ANALOGY
An analogy to the limited free speech rights of government employees shows how a relational nexus would work. As we have seen,
in cases where a student alleges that public schools have infringed
her free speech rights, most lower courts start by asking whether the
student’s speech took place on or off campus.130 If the latter, school
discipline often violates the First Amendment;131 if the former,
Tinker and its progeny apply132 and discipline may or may not be
constitutional depending on the substantial disruption test133 and its
exceptions for lewd,134 sponsored,135 and drug-related speech.136 In
the public employee context, courts ask a more nuanced question:
whether the speaker/employee was acting qua public employee at
the time or acting in her capacity as a private “citizen [commenting]

troversial subjects . . . if he does so without ‘materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school’ and without colliding with the rights of others.”). See also supra note 12.
130
See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.
131
See, e.g., Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089–
90 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (refusing to apply Tinker because the speech at issue was
created entirely off-campus).
132
See supra notes 48–52, briefly discussing LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257
F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001); Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of the Sch. Dist. of Greenfield,
134 F.3d 821, 822 (7th Cir. 1998); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir.
2008); and Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177–
78, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
133
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
134
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
135
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
136
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007).
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on a matter of public concern.”137 If the former, she has no free
speech claims against employer sanction; if the latter, she may have
free speech claims if the benefits to society outweigh the harm to the
workplace’s ability to conduct its business.138 This relational nexus,
defined by the connection between her actions and her environment,
could reach speech conducted entirely off campus.
As in the student speech context, most public employee speech
cases involve speech inside the workplace.139 But those are just the
easiest cases, not the full extent of the doctrine. Government employees’ speech can be restricted even if it originated and took place
beyond the four walls of the office if, when engaging in speech, the
employees were acting in their capacity as employees. In Pickering
v. Board of Education, for example, a public school teacher was
fired for writing and sending a letter to the editor of a local newspaper criticizing educational policy decisions made by the school
board.140 The Court nevertheless applied the balancing test because
the speech was closely related to the teacher’s role as a teacher.141
In City of San Diego v. Roe, in which a San Diego police officer sold
pornographic videos of himself dressed in a generic police uniform,142 the Supreme Court explicitly rejected a physical workplace
presence requirement for triggering the balancing test.143 The videos
and related website, made entirely outside the workplace, made a
point of connecting the officer to his career as a policeman: he wore
a uniform, made law enforcement references, and described himself
as “in the field of law enforcement.”144 The balancing test did not
137

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). This is known as the Pickering balancing test, originating in Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568
(1968).
138
See id. at 417–18; see also Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (1968).
139
See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141 (1983) (public employee
distributed a questionnaire to office coworkers that challenged, criticized, and
called for reform of the office transfer policy).
140
391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968).
141
Id. at 568–69 (“The problem in any case is to arrive at the balance between
the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency
of the public services it performs through its employees.”).
142
543 U.S. 77, 78 (2004) (per curiam).
143
See id. at 82–84.
144
Id. at 81.
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ultimately apply because the officer was clearly leveraging his position as a police officer and because his expression did not qualify
as a matter of public concern.145 On the other side of the coin is
United States v. National Treasury Employees Union.146 There, the
Court refused to trigger the balancing test to evaluate a ban on federal employees receiving honoraria for outside writing and speeches
because, like other former federal workers-cum-writers Nathaniel
Hawthorne, Herman Melville, and Walt Whitman,147 these plaintiffs
expressed their views on matters of public concern in their capacities
“as citizens, not as Government employees.”148 The evidence of this
was considerable: the expression had nothing to do with their jobs,
they did not address their writing to other government employees,
and their speech had no impact on the workplace.149 In these cases,
the geographic origins of the speech made little difference. What
mattered was the relational nexus between the speaker and her audience and between the speaker and the workplace.
3. APPLYING THE RELATIONAL NEXUS
A smattering of lower courts have applied a relational, rather
than a geographic, test for determining whether Tinker applied to
student speech. In Thomas v. Board of Education, for example, students who created an independent magazine modeled after the “National Lampoon” could not be punished for its sexual content not

145
Id. at 84. See also id. at 83 (“Connick held that a public employee’s speech
is entitled to Pickering balancing only when the employee speaks ‘as a citizen
upon matters of public concern’ rather than ‘as an employee upon matters only of
personal interest.’” (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983))).
146
513 U.S. 454 (1995).
147
Hawthorne, author of The Scarlet Letter, and Melville, author of Moby
Dick, worked for the United States Customs Office. Whitman, the transcendentalist poet and author of Leaves of Grass, worked for the Department of Justice
and the Department of the Interior. See EDWIN HAVILAND MILLER, SALEM IS MY
DWELLING PLACE: A LIFE OF NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE 169 (Iowa City 1st ed.
1991); Steven Olsen Smith, Introduction to MELVILLE IN HIS OWN TIME: A
BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE OF HIS LIFE, DRAWN FROM RECOLLECTIONS,
INTERVIEWS, AND MEMOIRS BY FAMILY, FRIENDS, AND ASSOCIATES xviii (Steven
Olsen Smith, ed. 2015); GAY WILSON ALLEN, THE SOLITARY SINGER: A CRITICAL
BIOGRAPHY OF WALT WHITMAN 319–20, 322, 408 (1967).
148
Nat’l Treasury Emp.’s Union, 513 U.S. at 465–66.
149
Id. at 465.
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because the magazine was created off campus,150 but because the
students “deliberately designed” their work to have no connection
to the school, their education, or their peers.151 As such, they were
not acting qua students and this was a non-student speech case.152
They were humorists and political activists, identities not connected
to the youth’s membership in the school community.153
However, students were acting qua students when their otherwise off-campus speech targeted specific members of the school
community. In Wisniewski v. Board of Education, a student’s offcampus creation and narrow distribution of an icon that depicted the
murder of a teacher triggered Tinker because the graphic, which
would not have been created but for the student’s connection to the
school, had the potential to affect the educational environment.154
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court came to a similar decision in J.S.
v. Bethlehem Area School District, in which a student created a vulgar and derogatory website on his teacher.155 The website, which
depicted the teacher’s head dripping with blood, morphing into
Adolph Hitler, and soliciting funds to pay for a hit man,156 was never
distributed inside the geographic boundaries of the school, but it had
a significant effect on its target.157 The teacher took a leave of absence and suffered physical and emotional harm, not to mention humiliation and loss of respect.158 Tinker was triggered not by physical
presence, but by the content and effects of the website and its creator’s and target’s connection to the school.159
A relational nexus should also be applied in cyberbullying cases.
Peer-to-peer cyberbullying cases that involve an aggressor targeting
150

Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1045 (2d Cir. 1979).
Id. at 1050. Admittedly, some activity related to the magazine did take
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See id; See also Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 964, 975
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system).
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See Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1045.
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494 F.3d 34, 36, 39–40 (2d Cir. 2007).
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a victim he or she knows from school would not exist but for their
connection to the school. As the court noted in J.S., “the web site
was aimed not at a random audience, but at the specific audience of
students and others connected with this particular School District.”160 If a student reaches into the school community and attacks
a victim he knows only through school, then he is acting as a member of the school community.161 Tinker applies.162 More generally,
the lesson from the Supreme Court’s quartet of student speech cases
and, by analogy, its public employee speech cases, is that Tinker can
be triggered by student speech that is related to the speaker’s contextual connection to the school—when he is acting as a student qua
student. Most student-to-student cyberbullying, particularly where
the aggressor and victim attend the same school, will qualify. This
stands in contrast to adolescents who engage in dissident speech that
has nothing to do with the school environment or students who may
cyberharass someone they know (or have never met) in an entirely
different context.
Consider a few hypotheticals. Jill is a sophomore. After a few
weeks attending the local public high school, she grows close to
Jack, a junior, with whom she has one class and lunch. During their
three-month relationship, Jill consents to Jack taking several intimate photos of her. After their breakup, Jack posts these photos to
his blog163 along with derogatory, misogynistic, and hateful comments. He considers them funny jokes and commentary on “how
difficult women can be.”164 He also taunts Jill on Twitter and sends
her text messages that alternate between criticizing her character and
160

Id. at 865.
See id.
162
See id. at 867–68.
163
For now, I put to one side Jack’s liability as a perpetrator of nonconsensual
pornography or cyberexploitation, or the posting on the Internet of graphic or intimate images of another without their consent. As of January, 2017, thirty-four
states and the District of Columbia had criminal nonconsensual pornography laws
and California, under Attorney General Kamala Harris, has been aggressively pursuing those who violate their victims in this way. See Danielle Keats Citron &
Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345,
368 (2014). This essay is exclusively focused on a school’s disciplinary authority
over student-to-student cyberbullying.
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appearance and begging for her to take him back. Some of Jack’s
friends join in on the behavior, and Jill notices that many people will
no longer talk to her at school and appear to be whispering behind
her back. There is, however, no evidence that any image or harassing
behavior made it onto school grounds. It would be difficult to subject Jack to Tinker’s substantial disruption standard under a campus
presence requirement. Posting images, commenting on them, and
attacking Jill on Twitter and through text messages all took place off
campus. Yet there is no doubt that Jack was acting in his capacity as
a member of the school both he and Jill attend. He met her through
school and his behavior after they parted was both reasonably likely
to—and actually did—have an effect on Jill and the educational environment in the school.
At the other end of the spectrum are cases where the aggressor,
victim, and harassment have no relational nexus to the school, i.e.,
where they are not acting qua student. Sasha and Samantha, for example, are 15 and 17 years old respectively, and are teammates on a
county-run soccer team. When they are not playing soccer, they attend public schools in neighboring districts. After losing out to Samantha in a competitive tryout for goalie, Sasha creates a fake
Facebook profile of Samantha and posts critical comments and unflattering or doctored photos. She also trolls Samantha on Twitter
using a pseudonymous handle. Sasha would be violating Facebook’s
Terms of Service, which prohibit impersonation and fake profiles.165
Depending on the types of comments she made on Twitter, Sasha
might also run afoul of Twitter’s anti-harassment policies.166 But it
is hard to see how either Samantha’s or Sasha’s school could get
involved, absent a stronger connection between the young women
and their school communities.
As always, the tougher cases are in the middle. Behavior that is
multicontextual, i.e., in part based on the aggressor’s and victim’s
connections to the school environment and in part related to outside
connections, can still trigger Tinker because the behavior at least
somewhat arises from students acting qua students and members of
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the same school.167 And attenuated connections may break the link:
a student who cyberbullies a fellow student’s friend he or she met at
a house party may not fall under Tinker’s sweep if the connection
was truly divorced from the school context. The central point is this:
the fulcrum upon which to judge Tinker’s applicability to student
cyberspeech is the student’s capacity as a student acting qua student
and his connection to the school environment and educational mission.168 In most student-to-student cyberbullying cases involving
students of the same school, that requirement would be satisfied. It
would not be met when students exercise their rights to contribute
to the marketplace of ideas through satire, critique, and public comment.
IV. A COMPELLING INTEREST
So far I have argued that Tinker’s substantial disruption standard
for evaluating student speech can be applied even when the speech
originated and took place off campus. A physical presence requirement is meaningless in the Internet age. And, in any event, the Court
never actually stated that student speech must be within the school’s
physical boundaries to come under Tinker’s umbrella.169 Rather, the
Court’s language in Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse, not to
mention its public employee speech cases, suggests that the test for
applying the substantial disruption standard is a relational one, based
on the speaker’s connection to the school environment and his behavior as student qua student.170 Applying that test would permit
greater school disciplinary authority over cyberbullies. And despite
the fact that school administrators have not always perfectly deployed that authority,171 more flexibility to move against cyberbullying would, on balance, be a good thing for several reasons.
167
See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
513 (1969).
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See generally id.
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See generally id.
170
See supra Section C and accompanying notes.
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First, cyberbullying can devastate its victims, most of whom are
members of marginalized groups. In her definitive account of cyberharassment and its effects, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace, Danielle
Keats Citron notes that victims experience mood swings, anxiety,
depression, panic attacks, fear of social interactions, post-traumatic
stress disorder,172 and a panoply of other injuries.173 Cyberharassment victims also report increases in alcohol and substance abuse.174
Student victims of cyberbullying withdraw from school activities
and both face-to-face and online social interaction.175 To adults,
these effects are serious enough, but to adolescents, they can be devastating.176 Cyberharassment has been linked to lower educational
achievement and diminished professional success.177 Adolescent

He Can’t Run for Prom King: ‘We Stand with Him 100%’”, FOX6NOW.COM (Apr.
6, 2016, 9:00 PM), http://fox6now.com/2016/04/06/transgender-student-told-hecant-run-for-prom-king/; Kamaria Roberts, Chicago School District Discriminated Against Transgender Student, Report Says, PBS (Nov. 4, 2015, 5:34 PM),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/chicago-school-district-discriminatedtransgender-student-report-says/.
172
CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 16, at 10–12. See also
Adrienne Nishina & Jaana Juvonen, Daily Reports of Witnessing and Experiencing Peer Harassment in Middle School, 76 CHILD DEV. 435, 444 (2005) (measuring anxiety, humiliation, school dislike, and anger as negative effects of peer harassment); Michele L. Ybarra et al., Examining Characteristics and Associated
Distress Related to Internet Harassment: Findings From the Second Youth Internet Survey, 118 PEDIATRICS 1169, 1172 (2006) (reporting that 38% of youth were
distressed by a single incident of harassment); Michele L. Ybarra, Linkages between Depressive Symptomatology and Internet Harassment among Young Regular Internet Users, 7 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 247, 252 (2004) (discussing
depressive symptomatology as “significantly related to the report of online harassment”).
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Id. at 248.
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(2007).
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anxiety contributes to poor socialization, long term depression, and
marginalization.178 The list goes on.179
When adolescent victims of cyberharassment are members of a
traditionally marginalized group like women and the LGBT community, the effects may be even worse.180 Women and young girls
are uniquely targeted online.181 Over an 11-year period, they consti-

178

See id. at 69–71; see also CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra
note 16, at 11.
179
See, e.g., Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178–79 (9th
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abuse, and made to feel inferior, serves to injure and intimidate them, as well as
to damage their sense of security and interfere with their opportunity to learn. The
demeaning of young gay and lesbian students in a school environment is detrimental not only to their psychological health and well-being, but also to their educational development. Indeed, studies demonstrate that ‘academic underachievement, truancy, and dropout are prevalent among homosexual youth and are the
probable consequences of violence and verbal and physical abuse at school.’ One
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success in life.”) (internal citations omitted). See also MICHAEL BOCHENEK & A.
WIDNEY BROWN, HATRED IN THE HALLWAYS: VIOLENCE AND DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER STUDENTS IN U.S.
SCHOOLS 49 (Human Rights Watch, 2001); Kelli Kristine Armstrong, The Silent
Minority Within a Minority: Focusing on the Needs of Gay Youth in our Public
Schools, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 67, 76–77 (1994) (describing how abuse
by peers causes gay youth to experience social isolation and drop out of school);
Maurice R. Dyson & Nicolyn Harris, Safe Rules or Gays’ Schools? The Dilemma
of Sexual Orientation Segregation in Public Education, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183,
187 (2004) (gay teens “face greater risks of . . . dropping out [and] performing
poorly in school”); Amy Lovell, “Other Students Always Used to Say, ‘Look at
the Dykes’”: Protecting Students from Peer Sexual Orientation Harassment, 86
CALIF. L. REV. 617, 625–28 (1998) (summarizing the negative effects on gay students of peer sexual orientation harassment).
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tuted at least 72% of cyberharassment victims and 60% of cyberstalking victims.182 They are 90% of revenge porn victims.183 Internet chat users with female names receive, on average, 100 harassing
messages for every four received by users with male names.184 That
is twenty-five times more hate directed at women than men. They
are routinely attacked, reduced to sexual objects, shamed, and
threatened, merely for being women.185 These effects may be even
worse for LGBT individuals for several reasons. Because LGBT and
questioning youth often rely on online social networks to replace
non-existent face-to-face communities,186 cyberharassment threatens to cut off their only outlet in which they can be themselves. As
early as 2001, more than 85% percent of LGB adolescents reported
that the Internet had been the most “important resource for them to
connect with LGB peers.”187 Destruction of that online social support network through cyberharassment is, therefore, particularly
harmful because it turns what might have been a gay student’s safe
space into a danger zone. Furthermore, institutional discrimination
faced by LGBT individuals metastasizes the psychological effects
of cyberharassment because, as Mark Hatzenbuehler has shown, in-
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stitutional discrimination enhances all mood, anxiety, and psychological disorders.188 In a 2010 study, Hatzenbuehler found that institutional discrimination can have a statistically significant negative
effect on the mental health of LGB persons: lesbians, gay men, and
bisexual individuals who lived in states that banned gay couples
from marrying experienced mood, anxiety, and psychiatric disorders
at higher rates than LGB persons living in equality states.189 It makes
sense, then, that LGBT victims of bullying and harassment rival
only homeless LGBT youth in the frequency and severity of psychological injury in the community.190 Schools have an interest in
protecting their most vulnerable students from having their lives derailed by cyberharassment.191
Second, and as these statistics suggest, cyberbullying is often a
gendered and sexualized phenomenon that amounts to discrimination on the basis of sex.192 Whether victims are attacked for being
gay, bisexual, or transgender, for gender nonconformity, or for being a woman in a man’s world, cyberharassment tends to take on the
characteristics of an identity-based attack.193 This piles on its own
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horrors. It conveys a message of worthlessness, stigmatizing an entire group of people as second class.194 This in turn encourages others to join in the aggression and instills a sense of self-hatred within
victims.195 It also makes cyberbullying anathematic to an effective
educational environment: when victims feel attacked and treated
like second class citizens, they are less likely to participate in class
and succeed.196
Third, far from protecting speech, tolerating cyberbullying silences speech.197 Victims retreat from online life, excluding valuable perspectives from public discourse.198 We know, for example,
that one of the most common refrains victims of cyberbullying and
cyberharassment hear is to turn off their computers, leave Facebook,
or stop checking Twitter.199 As a response to the problem, that recommendation is offensive: it puts the onus on the victim to rescue
herself and absolves the perpetrator of any real punishment.200 As
Citron has argued, preventing online harassment and allowing those
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who would otherwise be bullied into silence to contribute to the marketplace of ideas would “advance the reasons why we protect speech
in the first place.”201 Otherwise, adolescent victims in school will
stop contributing to school society; many will move to escape their
harassers even though a new address is not safe from a cyberharasser.202
When a school considers punishing one of its students for cyberbullying another, these are the values at stake: the school’s commitment to educating its students, ensuring equality, and preventing the
marginalization of minority groups. These values are simply not at
issue when students engage in “higher value” speech that does not
target, defame, and harass. Therefore, schools have a compelling interest to take steps to eradicate cyberbullying, wherever it takes
place, because of the significant damage it can do to the school’s
ability to teach all its students.
CONCLUSION
That cyberbullies harass their victims outside the physical
boundaries of a school does not immunize them from school discipline.203 The First Amendment is not blind to changes wrought by
Internet technologies. Nor has the Supreme Court ever held that
Tinker can only be triggered by on-campus speech.204 But punishment can only get us so far. Although this essay is limited to arguing
for a relational trigger for Tinker, it does not suggest that greater
discipline can eradicate cyberbullying on its own. Schools need to
take affirmative steps to improve school climate, address the root
causes of bullying and cyberbullying, and teach full acceptance of
marginalized groups. Disciplining cyberbullies can help establish
norms that recognize cyberharassment as anathematic to freedom,
autonomy, and equality. That is undoubtedly part of a school’s educational mission.
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